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Corporate smart city initiatives are just one example of the contemporary culture of surveillance. 
They rely on extensive information gathering systems and Big Data analysis to predict citizen 
behaviour and optimise city services. In this paper we argue that many smart city and social media 
technologies result in a paradox whereby digital inclusion for the purposes of service provision 
also results in marginalisation and disempowerment of citizens. Drawing upon insights garnered 
from a digital inclusion workshop conducted in the Galapagos islands, we propose that critically 
and creatively unpacking the computational techniques embedded in data services is needed as 
a first step if we are to reimagine neganthropic, sustainable and empowering data services for 
inhabitants in diverse localities. We propose a therapeutic inspired by the concept of ‘common 
ground’ from communication theory. Common ground presupposes a symmetry of purpose, 
shared values and accessible participation processes. When common ground is deployed in the 
smart city context it prompts us to reimagine data services as an ongoing dialogue between peers, 
to rethink citizen participation in terms of capabilities and empowerment, and to focus on clear 
lines of accountability and equality of citizen outcomes.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The smart city as a concept emerged in marketing discourse in the 2000s and it 
is just the latest technological solution to promise better management and 
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administration of cities1. Previously we had the ‘wired city, the ‘city of bits’, the 
‘computable city’ and the ‘network city’. The emergence of smart city projects in 
Western countries is driven by a range of public research programmes, 
governments, market research consultancies and companies who are shaping a 
public expectation that contemporary digital technologies and artificial intelligence 
(AI) solutions will make public and private services more efficient and less costly2. 
The current iteration of smart city solutions requires both extensive datafication and 
dataveillance of city inhabitants and the integration of this data with other forms of 
data on the city. A range of predictive analytic techniques using the latest generation 
of AI, such as deep learning, are then applied to that data3. The results are used by 
human decision makers, or automated processes, to shape the delivery of services 
and infrastructures. Many smart city initiatives involve commercial companies 
partnering with cities, or taking over the running of city services, with little 
democratic oversight, accountability or scrutiny of the values or ethics of the 
projects. For Zuboff4 this constitutes the development of a new apparatus of 
surveillance which she calls ‘Big Other’.   
The dominant smart city approaches to city administration has been extensively 
criticised from different disciplines, but governments, companies and researchers 
persist with smart city projects and initiatives. The term is now deployed to frame a 
wide variety of projects and technologies, but analysis of these projects has found 
that they often fail to empower all city inhabitants equally and may have detrimental 
social, political and environmental outcomes for some. What is evident is that we 
urgently need to bridge the gap between smart city discourses and the reality of 
everyday life in cities for millions of people. A majority of the world’s population 
now lives in cities, and urbanisation is accelerating. Smart city discourses prioritise 
a top-down managerial and technocratic perspective of what a city is. However, cities 
are much more than machines to be managed and organised. Cities are complex 
social structures with dense populations which have their own rhythms5. They have 
formal and informal markets, cultures, services and infrastructures. They are 
locations, places, and spaces. They have legal and illegal inhabitants. They are a 
 
1 M. Zook, “Crowd-sourcing the smart city: Using big geosocial media metrics in urban 
governance.” Big Data & Society 4 (1), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951717694384; R. Kitchin, 
P. Cardullo, C. Di Feliciantonio. “Citizenship, Justice, and the Right to the Smart City.” In P. 
Cardullo, C. Di Feliciantonio, R. Kitchin (eds.), The Right to the Smart City. Bingley: Emerald 
Publishing Limited, 2019, 1-24. 
2 A. Kerr, M. Barry, J. D. Kelleher. “Expectations of artificial intelligence and the performativity 
of ethics: Implications for communication governance.” Big Data & Society 7 (1), 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951720915939.  
3 J. D. Kelleher, Deep Learning. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2019.  
4 S. Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of 
power. London: Profile Books, 2019, pp. 376-397. 
5 H. Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life. London: A&C Black, 2004. 
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‘theatre for social action’, and a complex exorganism6. Many evolve organically and 
chaotically, and they are, as Lefebvre7 and later Massey8 noted, socially produced 
and relational. Cities have had distinct forms of governmentality over time, and 
values and politics can be designed into the fabric of cities as Winner noted9. Yet 
while cities may be planned from above, they are experienced and lived from below, 
from the interactions of citizens, from the interplay of formal and informal 
structures and a myriad of practices. Cities may be spaces, but they are also places 
of dwelling and belonging10.  
Our approach to smart cities draws upon our respective backgrounds in 
communication studies, sociology and computer science. In this paper we 
conceptually explore the paradox that digital inclusion in smart city initiatives can 
lead to digital dis-empowerment for urban inhabitants and new forms of 
discrimination. We first situate our approach to contemporary smart city efforts 
within the broader ‘cultures of surveillance’ context enabled by commercial social 
media and the development of a pervasive platform logic to gather and exploit large 
volumes of data. We argue that at the core of post-industrial informational 
technologies are systems which by their design optimise and marginalise. Within 
information driven optimisation systems some of the key decisions are those 
pertaining to what should be optimised, the criterion used to define the optimal 
outcome, and what data is considered within the process. These subjective decisions 
often determine the outcome of the optimisation. Statements about the ‘objectivity’ 
of the information driven process that led to the decision conveniently ignore these 
human subjective stages in the process. Furthermore, in today’s smart cities the 
deployment of contemporary AI techniques such as machine learning optimise and 
marginalise in new ways, both mathematically and socially, with a range of emergent 
outcomes for city inhabitants.  
Many contemporary technical approaches to data gathering, analysis and 
exploitation are asymmetrical with regard to the knowledge and power of city 
inhabitants (and the observed) and are based on the assumption that human data is 
a freely available and a given resource. This has immense implications for the social, 
political and environmental sustainability of our cities. Digital inclusion in general, 
and in smart city initiatives more specifically, has a range of positive connotations 
and some positive outcomes. In this paper we critically and conceptually engage 
with the potentially negative implications of digital inclusion in smart cities for the 
everyday lives of city inhabitants and their rights. If we, as citizens, are included in 
the data flows of contemporary cities, but excluded from shaping, questioning or 
 
6 See B. Stiegler, “New Urban Engineering, New Urban Genius.” 2018/11/22/, Lecture, Tongji 
University, Shanghai. 
7 H. Lefebvre, The production of space/Production de l’espace. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 
8 D. Massey, Space, place and gender. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
9 L. Winner, “Do artifacts have politics?”. Daedalus, 1980, pp. 121-136. 
10 See R. Sennett, Building and Dwelling. Ethics for the City. Milton Keynes: Penguin, 2018.  
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critiquing them, or if we have no understanding of how the production logics and 
techniques of data driven optimisation and prediction work, or if we have no say in 
the decisions controlling what is optimized and who it is optimised for, are we in 
fact losing control of our data, being disempowered and socially excluded? 
Attempts at public participation in the design of smart cities are often tokenistic and 
give little opportunity to co-produce the design of smart city projects. Or they only 
include privileged and already empowered inhabitants of the city. Digital inclusion 
in smart cities may even be detrimental to citizen rights. In the final sections we 
argue that we need to go beyond current solutions to user empowerment that focus 
on technical solutions, citizen centric design and ethics guidelines. We borrow from 
models of dialogue to propose that smart city initiatives that involve city inhabitants 
need to create a common ground and build capabilities attuned to the specifics of 
localities if they are to protect public values and maintain the trust of urban 
inhabitants and city administrators. Only then can we reimagine a more symmetrical 
economy of contribution and greater citizen empowerment in real city contexts.  
SMART CITIES IN A CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 
Smart cities are not a unique socio-technical infrastructure. Smart cities are just 
one part of a wider culture of surveillance across contemporary economies and 
everyday life. What some call surveillance capitalism11, David Lyon calls a ‘culture 
of surveillance’ that brings together the activities of private corporations and states 
with the everyday activities of urban inhabitants as we hail taxis and buy food using 
apps, as we search for accommodation online and rate our lecturers12. The growth 
of a culture of surveillance and smart cities is in part due to the rapid growth in 
computing power and the widescale diffusion of fast internet and networked or 
smart screens, sensing devices and objects in many countries. With the diffusion in 
many countries of commercial but free to download social media over the past 
decade, and the introduction of AI systems by state and city governments to better 
administer transport, policing and public services, we are all participating in a shared 
culture of surveillance. In this culture of surveillance power is asymmetrical and in 
many instances the gathering and use of data is not transparent to the citizen. We 
may freely use, and feel digitally included, in the digital economy – especially by the 
cute representations of interaction and networking that are presented back to us as 
icons and numbers. At the same time, we may be completely unaware of the deeper 
levels of datafication, extraction and prediction that are being conducted using our 
 
11 See S. Zuboff, “Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information 
civilization.” Journal of Information Technology 30 (1), 2015, pp. 75-89, and Id., The age of 
surveillance capitalism. 
12 D. Lyon, The culture of surveillance: Watching as a way of life. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 
2018. 
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data and its implications for our autonomy and freedom as consumers and citizens. 
The uses to which our data is put may only become apparent when we are refused 
the right to board an aircraft because of our security profile and we fail to be 
shortlisted for a job because our address, travel history or gender weigh too heavily 
against us. Or ironically, the lack of a data profile may equally be used as a reason 
to deny one the right to move or to participate in the city.   
Taking a culture of surveillance approach, we can see that the city is not just 
created by top down technological systems, but it is also created by a range of 
bottom up practices of inhabitants, including their social media use (in the broadest 
sense). Cities with informal settlements, with non-marketized forms of work, and 
with a variety of local cultures, pose immense problems for a data driven system of 
algorithmic control intent on capturing all available data. The informal flows of 
urban inhabitants are however captured by commercial social media services and 
shared across smart city and social media infrastructures. Individuals who 
participate in informal and non-market practices may be politically excluded, but 
digitally included in commodified data flows. Citizens who are formally included in 
the marketized institutions of their cities and represented in its public and private 
digital streams may be digitally included but their agency may be reduced to data 
provider, ‘user’ of privatised data flows and target for advertising. Just as earlier 
conceptualisations of knowledge in the knowledge economy narrowed our 
understandings of knowledge to that which could be codified and traded13, similarly 
current conceptualisations of data and AI are narrowing what we conceptualise as 
data to that which can be digitised, analysed computationally and exploited 
economically. Data about a city and its inhabitants exists in many forms – from 
stories and images, to sounds and memories. Indeed, Fitzpatrick argues that the 
data city might be a better term14. A data city explicitly acknowledges that the data 
representing a city should, for example, include historical records (e.g., early census 
data) and fictional representations (such a Joyce’s portrayal of Dublin in Ulysses). 
Currently, smart city technologies reduce cities to uniform spaces without histories 
or variation. Smart cities are not designed to capture this variety of data, and they 
cannot see it. Smart cities are designed to ‘flatten out’ knowledge to what can be 
datafied. Smart cities don’t count or can’t count the social life of cities and civic life 
in the city. Further, smart city solution providers rarely engage with discussions 
about environmental sustainability and the Anthropocene beyond superficial 
platitudes. There is little assessment of the impact of smart city initiatives and their 
data farms on land, energy and water use. 
 
13 A. Kerr, S. Ó Riain, “Knowledge Economy.” In R. Kitchin, N. Thrift (eds.), International 
Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Oxford: Elsevier, 2009, pp. 31-36. 
14 N. Fitzpatrick, “Questions concerning attention and Stiegler’s therapeutics.” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory 52 (4), 2020, pp. 348-360. 
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Most commercial social media share a common production logic with smart city 
projects. Indeed, often the services are offered by the same companies. A 
production logic is a relatively stable set of institutional forms and relationships 
created by the commodification and industrialisation of culture15. The concept 
developed in relation to the traditional cultural industries where three dominant 
production logics were identified – the editorial, the publishing and the flow logic. 
The approach has been adapted to the contemporary cultural and creative 
industries16. The smart city production logic most closely adheres to a commercial 
data platform logic. This logic has become more evident since the 2008 financial 
crash and the necessity in public administration to focus on efficiency and cost 
savings. Indeed, some argue that the 2008 crisis necessitated a shift in the narratives 
of smart cities from an emphasis on sustainability and climate change to a narrative 
focussed on entrepreneurship and platformisation17. This logic produces data 
markets that are brokered by private corporations, turn public servants and public 
institutions into project managers/commissioners, circulates freely given and citizen 
created content, and datafies its citizens by extracting digital forms of data, analysing 
them and creating economic value out of them. Smart city technologies mobilise 
sensors and other technologies in the city to gather live data about, and from, 
inhabitants and visitors to the city and this data is then mined using AI to generate 
derived data about an individual so as to provide actionable insights for a range of 
third parties that enable them to optimize processes for their preferred outcomes. 
These procedures, processes and their outcomes are largely invisible to city 
inhabitants, and indeed they may be opaque to city administrators also. They are 
also anathema to those who conceptualise the city as a public space that should be 
shaped according to the needs of all inhabitants.  
The corporate smart city discourse is based on the datafication of social 
behaviour and the presumption that all meaningful activity can be sensed, measured 
and used to eradicate inefficiencies within workflows of a city, conceptualised as a 
machine18. It is ultimately another technique of societal control. The datafication 
and quantification of social behaviour is not new and scholars like Oscar Gandy 
have long analysed the use of decision support systems by commercial companies 
 
15 B. Miège, “The logics at work in the new cultural industries.” Media, Culture and Society 9 (3), 
1987, pp. 273-289, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/016344387009003002; Id., “Principal 
Ongoing Mutations of Cultural and Informational Industries.” In D. Winseck, D. Yong Jin (eds.), 
The Political Economies of Media. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. 
16 A. Kerr, Global Games. Production, Circulation and Policy in the Networked Age. New York: 
Routledge, 2017. 
17 B. Baykurt, C. Raetzsch, “What smartness does in the smart city: From visions to policy.” 
Convergence, 2020, 1354856520913405. 
18 S. Mattern, “Methodolatry and the Art of Measure.” Places Journal, 2013. 
https://doi.org/10.22269/131105. https://placesjournal.org/article/methodolatry-and-the-art-of-
measure/ 
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as ‘discriminatory technology in the panoptic sort’19. His 2016 book points to the 
widespread use of ‘predictive intelligence’ and warns of the social costs for citizens 
of the widespread use of discriminatory technologies to guide business decisions. 
His analysis draws upon the use of prediction techniques in finance, criminal justice 
and public policy formation in the United States. The detailed exploration of the 
use and potential outcomes of these technologies and their models is continued by 
Donald MacKenzie in relation to financial markets20, Joe Turow in his analysis of 
the advertising industry21 and Dencik et al. in relation to policing22. Mansell, 
Pierson, van Dijck, and Zuboff have drawn our attention to the negative 
implications of data extraction by social media for user empowerment, and Kelleher 
and Tierney23 highlight how the turn to data science can undermine privacy, amplify 
profiling, reinforce discrimination, and result in more technocratic societies24.  
Zuboff explores in detail the prediction imperative and its role in the logic of 
accumulation at companies like Google and Facebook. Zuboff details how surplus 
behavioural data can be analysed using ‘machine intelligence’25 to create value 
through selling this data to advertisers and others. She points to how contemporary 
commercial platform logics in search, social media and smart city technologies 
aim to capture more and more of everyday life, including locational data. This 
phase of surveillance capitalism is not only about mapping and routes, but about 
routing26. The focus of many of these techniques is not just about showing us 
relevant advertising and information, it is also about influencing user behaviour 
in ‘real spaces in everyday life’. Further, they reduce meaningful social activities 
to that which can be digitised, captured and exploited economically. They reduce 
city administration to the control and modification of data flows and city 
 
19 O. H. Gandy, “Coming to Terms with the Panoptic Sort Oscar.” Computers, surveillance, and 
privacy, 1996, p. 132, and Id., Coming to terms with chance: Engaging rational discrimination and 
cumulative disadvantage. London-New-York: Routledge, p. vii. 
20 See D. MacKenzie, An engine, not a camera: How financial models shape markets. Cambridge: 
Mit Press, 2008. 
21 See J. Turow, Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your 
Worth. New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 2012. 
22 L. Dencik, A. Hintz, Z. Carey, “Prediction, pre-emption and limits to dissent: Social media and 
big data uses for policing protests in the United Kingdom.” New Media & Society, volume 20 (4), 
2017, pp. 1433-1450. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817697722.  
23 J. D. Kelleher, B. Tierney, Data Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018. 
24 See R. Mansell, “Political Economy, Power and New Media.” New Media & Society 6 (1), 2004, 
pp. 96-105, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444804039910; Id., Imagining the Internet. 
Communication, Innovation, and Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; J. Pierson, 
“Online privacy in social media: a conceptual exploration of empowerment and vulnerability.” 
Communications & strategies (88), 2012, pp. 99-120; J. Van Dijck, “Datafication, dataism and 
dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology.”, Surveillance & society 12 (2), 
2014, pp. 197-208; S. Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism. 
25 S. Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism, p. 96. 
26 Ibid., p. 152. 
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inhabitants to their data traces. For van Dijck the normalisation of datafication and 
dataveillance across society has led to the emergence of a new paradigm or belief 
in ‘dataism’ – which assumes not just a belief in the objectivity of data, but also 
requires trust in the institutions and wider ecosystem that use it27. 
The smart city agenda must be conceptualised within this broader turn to 
dataveillance, prediction and dataism. It has justifiably received a lot of criticism. It 
has been criticized for its narrow conceptualization of ‘the city’ and attempts to 
reduce the complexity and uncertainty of urban life to a limited type of data. It has 
been criticised as providing technically determined solutions to social problems and 
technocratic and undemocratic forms of city governance28. While examples of 
smart cities being designed on green field sites exist – notably Masdar in the UAE 
and Songdo in South Korea – most ‘actually existing’ smart city initiatives are grafted 
onto existing cities and involve complex public/private partnerships or contracts29. 
Their diffusion has been facilitated by political choices at city, state and regional 
levels and targeted research and innovation investment. Recent research has 
identified different approaches to smart cities in North American and Europe, with 
the latter adopting a more ‘living labs’ approach30. Others point to different impacts 
of big data practices in postcolonial contexts and the need to attend to the 
differential development of citizen rights, power and marginalisation in different 
contexts31. In this context studies that highlight the ways in which citizens can re-
appropriate commercial smart city solutions as new forms of civic infrastructure are 
welcome32. Some research projects now explicitly try to reimagine city data 
gathering platforms in terms of public interest needs and civic infrastructures and 
others explore and build co-operative platforms33. These types of projects are 
however rare. More frequently we see that cities are being redesigned as 
‘entrepreneurial’ cities which brand and develop their services to promote business 
 
27 See J. Van Dijck, “Datafication, dataism and dataveillance…”. 
28 See E. Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2013. 
29 T. Shelton, M. Zook, A. Wiig, “The ‘actually existing smart city’.” Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society 8 (1), 2014, pp. 13-25. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsu026. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsu026. 
30 B. Baykurt, C. Raetzsch, “What smartness does in the smart city…”. 
31 E. Ruppert, E. Isin, “Data’s empire: postcolonial data politics.”. In D. Bigo, E. Isin, E. Ruppert 
(eds). Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights. London: Routledge. 
32 S. Y. Perng, S. Maalsen, “Civic Infrastructure and the Appropriation of the Corporate Smart 
City.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 110 (2), 2020, pp. 507-515. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2019.1674629.  
33 See for examples the European DECODE project at https://decodeproject.eu/ and the 
international projects at https://platform.coop/  
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innovation and consumption34, rather than deliver public spaces and services for all 
inhabitants35. 
Legislative and activist attention on datafication has largely focussed on the 
privacy implications of mainstreaming dataveillance and cultures of surveillance. In 
Europe data protection legislation is beginning to regulate the ways in which smart 
cities can work. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was 
introduced in 2018 and is one of the first major legislative attempts to regulate data 
gathering and to protect user privacy, particularly in relation to personal data. This 
regulation supplements and strengthens existing policies such as the Data Privacy 
Shield which attempted to provide a legal basis for the sharing of data between 
companies in the US and Europe36. GDPR and related policies aim to make data 
gathering and use more transparent and those who are gathering it more 
accountable. However, a useful starting point in this aim of greater transparency in 
contemporary data economies is to understand how ‘smartness’ in smart cities 
works. Smartness in smart cities relies not just on data gathering and extraction, but 
also on applying prediction and optimisation techniques to that data to generate 
‘actionable insights’ that inform decisions and shape outcomes. In what follows we 
introduce the concepts of digital footprints and explore how predictive modelling 
in AI operates37.  
DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS AND PREDICTIVE MODELLING IN AI 
The proliferation of sensors in modern urban environments and the diffusion of 
smart phones and social media use means that it has never been easier to collect 
data on citizens. The amount of data that is currently captured about citizens as they 
move through an urban environment is much higher than most inhabitants are 
aware of, and can be done through a variety of channels, including face recognition 
applied to on-street or in-door video surveillance, credit card purchases and ATM 
withdrawals, loyalty schemes at supermarkets, and the tracking of mobile phone 
calls. In 2009 the Dutch Data Protection Authority estimated that the average Dutch 
citizen was recorded in 250 to 500 databases, and this figure could rise to 1,000 
 
34 P. Lawton, “An Analysis of Urban Public Space in Three European Cities: London, Dublin and 
Amsterdam.” Geography. University of Dublin, 2009. 
35 See L. O’Keeffe “Spaces of Reproduction: How Teenagers Co-construct post-industrial 
soundscapes in Smithfield, Dublin” (2014). PhD Sociology, Maynooth University, available online: 
http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/view/ethesisauthor/O_Keeffe=3ALinda=3A=3A.html. P. 
Lawton, “An Analysis of Urban Public Space in Three European Cities…”; L. O’Keeffe, A. Kerr, 
“Reclaiming Public Space: Sound and Mobile Media Use by Teenagers.” International Journal of 
Communication 9, 2015. http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/3674 
36 C. O’Rourke, A. Kerr, “Privacy Shields for Whom? Key Actors and Privacy Discourses on 
Twitter and in Newspapers.” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 12 (3), 2017. 
37 J. D. Kelleher, B. Tierney, Data Science. 
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databases for some citizens38. Haggerty and Ericson introduce the concept of the 
‘data double’39 building upon the work of Mark Poster40, to conceptualise an 
abstract multiplication or an additional self that circulates in centres of calculation. 
Others call it our data shadow, and they argue that “what we are witnessing at this 
point in time is the triumph of representation over being”41.    
We introduce the term digital footprint to describe all the data trails that a person 
leaves as they move through an environment. These data trails can be captured 
under two different conditions: 1) a person may choose to share data about 
themselves, or 2), the data may be collected without the awareness and/or consent 
of the person. To distinguish these two conditions of data capture, the term data 
footprint is used to describe data that is collected with the awareness of the 
individual, and the concept of the data shadow is narrowed from its previous uses, 
to describe data that is captured about an individual without their awareness. Both 
are subsets of one’s digital footprint, see Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1 The Datafied Citizen 
 
The collection of data pertaining to an individual without their awareness is 
problematic, but it occurs constantly in public smart city projects. However, even 
data that is collected with the consent of an individual can be harmful to them in 
ways that they are not aware off and may be used, reshared, or repurposed in ways 
that they did not expect, or indeed were not aware were possible. The fact that 
multiple data sources may be merged without an individual’s knowledge means that 
different pieces of data that an individual consented to share in separate and distinct 
contexts may later be integrated into the digital footprint of the individual; and, these 
 
38 B.-J. Koops, “Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice.” SCRIPTed 8 (3), 2011, pp. 229-256. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986719. 
39 K. Haggerty, R. Ericson, “The surveillant assemblage.” The British Journal of Sociology, 51 (4): 
200, pp. 605-622 (613). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071310020015280. 
40 M. Poster, The Mode of Information. Poststructuralism and Social Context. Cambridge, UK.: 
Polity Press, 1990, p. 97. 
41 Critical Art Ensemble, 1995, cited in R. Kitchin, The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, 
Data Infrastructures & Their Consequences. London: Sage, 2014, p. 177. See http://critical-art.net/. 
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out-of-context data linkages, combined with the power of modern predictive 
modelling systems, means that accurate and inaccurate inferences in relation to 
sensitive personal characteristics (such as their sexual orientation, political and 
religious views, and their use of addictive substances) may be inferred from data that 
might appear unrelated. Indeed, it is just this type of inferential analysis of data that 
modern AI technologies enable. 
The AI methods used to analyse contemporary forms of big data are commonly 
termed: Machine Learning, Deep Learning and Predictive Analytics42. Broadly 
speaking modern AI can be understood as a set of technologies that are designed 
to support data-driven decision making. The core idea being that the AI system can 
‘crunch the numbers’ to find some insight into a problem that informs the outcome 
of the decision. The current wave of innovation in AI is primarily driven by machine 
learning. Machine learning is the subfield of AI that designs and evaluates 
algorithms that can learn from data. Within a datafied system, be it a smart city or 
some other system, all entities (people, objects, documents, locations, events, 
processes, and so on) are represented by vectors of features, where each feature 
records a measurement of a single aspect of the entity. In this context, machine 
learning from data involves selecting a computational model based on patterns of 
correspondence between features in a dataset so that the model can accurately map 
from a set of known input features to a value for an output feature. The computer 
model predicts the unknown output, and the computer model encodes the rules 
(extracted from the data by the machine learning algorithm) mapping from the 
inputs to the output. This task of mapping from a set of known inputs to the 
unknown output value is known as prediction, hence the computational model that 
encodes the mapping is known as a prediction model.  
To provide a concrete example of how predictive AI works imagine a citizen in 
a smart city applies for rent support. As is the case with all datafied entities the digital 
footprint of this citizen will be encoded as a vector of features. Now imagine, that 
one element (i.e., feature) of this citizen’s digital footprint is missing a value and this 
missing value would be useful in informing the rent support decision. There are 
many reasons why the value for a target feature may be missing from an individual’s 
digital footprint. Indeed, the citizen may have actively chosen to keep it private. 
Figure 2 illustrates this situation and uses the ‘?’ to indicate a missing value in the 
digital footprint. We use the term target feature to denote the feature in the dataset 
for which the value is missing. The goal of predictive AI is to predict the missing 
value of the target feature.  
 
42 J. D. Kelleher, Deep Learning; J. D. Kelleher, B. Tierney, Data Science. 
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Figure 2 The Datafied Citizen with Data Missing from their Digital Footprint 
 
This missing data value can be predicted (or inferred or estimated) using a 
prediction model. Figure 3 illustrates the data capture, analysis and decision process 
enabled by AI predictive models. The process begins by capturing data relating to 
other citizens in the city in which the digital footprint of each citizen included in the 
dataset records a measurement corresponding to the missing data for the citizen in 
Figure 2 (i.e., each of the digital footprints in the dataset records a value for the 
target feature for the citizen the digital footprint describes). Once the dataset has 
been created the data analysis process begins. There are two phases to the data 
analysis process, training and prediction (also known as inference). In the training 
phase a machine learning algorithm processes the dataset and selects the prediction 
model that most accurately maps from a set of known inputs (the values for the 
features in a digital footprint that are not the target feature) to a value for the target 
feature (i.e., the prediction model’s output). Once the prediction model has been 
selected the second phase of data analysis (the prediction or inference phase) 
begins. In this phase the incomplete digital footprint for the citizen is inputted – into 
the prediction model and the model generates an estimate of the value for the target 
feature. This predicted output is then used to inform the final decision of whether 
to grant rental support or not.  
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Figure 3 The data capture, analysis and decision cycle enabled by predictive AI 
 
The process of predicting an unknown output value based on a set of known 
inputs links to decision making in that the predicted value is used to inform or drive 
the decision. In the above example we have focused on predictions pertaining to 
individual citizens; however, the problems to which prediction techniques are 
applied are multiple: for example, a predictive model could be used to map from a 
set of inputs describing an email to an output that identifies whether the email is 
spam or not, from a set of features describing a loan application to an output 
determining whether the loan should be granted or not, from an image of a street 
to an output describing whether an ‘individual of interest’ is present in the image, 
from a set of features describing a location in a city at a particular time to whether a 
police patrol should be deployed there in the next hour, and so on. Furthermore, 
in many of these cases the prediction made by a model is not used by a human 
decision maker but rather triggers automated algorithmic governance. In scenarios 
where decisions are automated the prediction model is given an agency that directly 
impacts outcomes for individuals within a city. Indeed, even where a human 
decision maker is in the decision loop, prediction models still retain agency in that 
they often indirectly affect decisions and outcomes. In this new AI predictive reality, 
prediction is part of a new ‘animism’ as objects become more animated and active 
in our everyday lives43.  
One application of predictive analytics for which a significant amount of research 
has been done is to create predictive models that forecast individual trajectories 
through a city. The motivations for this research can range from optimizing traffic 
 
43 M. Hildebrandt, Smart technologies and the end (s) of law: novel entanglements of law and 
technology. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015. 
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managements, to urban planning, and location-based advertising44. The accuracy of 
predictive models on this task is very high. For example, Song et al. found a 
potential predictability of 93% across a dataset of human mobility of 50,000 
individuals45, and more recently Kulkarni et al. showed that by extending the 
information used by the predictive models the upper-bound on the accuracy of 
these models can be further increased46. The results of this research indicate that 
human mobility behaviour is highly predictive, irrespective of variations between 
individuals in terms of the distance they cover on a regular basis. A positive reading 
of the regularity and predictability of human mobility behaviour is that smart city 
technology can be successfully applied to a range of applications based on human 
mobility, e.g. traffic management, etc. However, the negative implication is that 
unless the appropriate safeguards in relation to data collection and data reuse are in 
place then individual privacy and freedoms are seriously diminished. The fact that 
modern data driven models can be used to infer an individual’s characteristics and 
to predict their location means that the infrastructure of a smart city can readily be 
repurposed to continuously surveil citizens.  
The development of a culture of surveillance with both commercial smart city 
technologies and broader social media technologies collecting data, both with and 
without our awareness, and a range of predictive technologies attempting to control 
and cajole social behaviour has turned the contemporary city into a generalised 
panopticon.  The panopticon is a building developed by Jeremy Bentham in the 
18
th
 century that was intended for use in institutions, such as prisons or psychiatric 
hospitals. The building was designed so that the staff could observe the inmates 
without the inmate’s knowledge, and so the inmates were forced to act as though 
they were always being watched. As Foucault notes the panopticon is “a mechanism 
of power reduced to its ideal form.”47 It is one of the most pervasive metaphors for 
the regulation of bodies by technologies and it has been applied to a range of 
technologies. Surveillance in the panopticon was based on looking and it was used 
to monitor and control people for specific purposes. 
Some have argued that the panopticon and surveillance as metaphors and 
concepts are insufficient to capture the ways in which contemporary big data is now 
being repurposed by corporations, states and citizens to surveil everyone 
 
44 V. Kulkarni, A. Mahalunkar, B. Garbinato, J. D. Kelleher, “Examining the Limits of 
Predictability of Human Mobility.” Entropy 21 (4), 2019, p. 432. https://doi.org/10.3390/e21040432. 
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/4/432. 
45 See C. Song, Z. Qu, N. Blumm, A. L. Barabasi, “Limits of Predictability in Human Mobility.” 
Science 327 (5968), 2010, pp. 1018-1021. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1177170; 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/doi/10.1126/science.1177170.  
46 See V. Kulkarni, A. Mahalunkar, B. Garbinato, J. D. Kelleher, “Examining the Limits of 
Predictability of Human Mobility.” 
47 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. New York: Random house, 1977. 
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everywhere48. We are post-panoptical for Lyon49 while others still wish to keep the 
critical insights of the original Foucauldian critique50. Indeed, even if we hold onto 
the critique, it might be appropriate to think about the convergence of discreet 
surveillance systems into broader ‘surveillant assemblages’ and to approach the 
culture of surveillance as one in which all types of data are gathered all the time for 
unspecified purposes51. As Lyons notes, while the surveillance state and surveillance 
capitalism suggest surveillance is done to us, surveillance culture is even broader 
and points to the deep entanglement of surveillance in all aspects of social life. Smart 
city systems cannot be divorced from everyday data driven consumer systems such 
as social media or supermarket reward systems. Even when our data is missing from 
the specific informational system, automated processes can be used to predict and 
infer our features with a high degree of accuracy. The focus of any therapeutics 
therefore needs to be not only on consent or awareness, but also on the ways in 
which these systems optimise and marginalise certain behaviours and outcomes.  
SMART CITIES AS SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS OF OPTIMISATION 
AND MARGINALISATION  
Sociologists of technology have long argued that technologies are never value 
free52. Thus, it is important to investigate the choices and values that are coded into 
contemporary datafication systems and optimisation techniques. In this section we 
aim to unbox some of the AI technologies and methods within Zuboff’s prediction 
imperative and debunk the notion that such systems are value free. The commercial 
smart city discourse foregrounds the computational quantification and algorithmic 
governance of a city to more efficiently manage infrastructures and services and 
reduce costs53. The technocratic language often positions city administrations as 
 
48 See M. Andrejevic, “The Work of Watching One Another: Lateral Surveillance, Risk, and 
Governance.” Surveillance & Society ‘People Watching People’ 2 (3), 2004, p. 479. 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org; S. Braman, “Information, Policy and Power in the 
Informational State.” In S. Braman (ed.), Change of State. Information, Policy and Power. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, pp. 313-328. 
49 D. Lyon, The culture of surveillance, p. 34. 
50 See B. Simon, “The Return of Panopticism:Supervision, Subjection and the New Surveillance.” 
Surveillance & Society 3 (1), 2005, pp. 1-20. http://www.surveillance-and-
society.org/articles3(1)/return.pdf. 
51 See R. Ericson, K. Haggerty, The new politics of surveillance and visibility. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2006 and K. Haggerty, R. Ericson, “The surveillant assemblage”; S. Braman 
“Information, Policy and Power in the Informational State”; J. Van Dijck, “Datafication, dataism and 
dataveillance…”. 
52 See A. Feenberg, Questioning Technology. Vol. Book, Whole. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 
2012; J. Wajcman, Techno Feminism. Cambridge: Polity, 2004; L. Winner, “Do artifacts have 
politics?”. 
53 A. Greenfield, Against the smart city. 1.3 edition. New York: Do projects, 2013. 
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inefficient, private enterprise as the deliverer of innovative solutions, and city 
inhabitants as passive providers of data and receivers of services54. They portray 
smart city technologies as data driven algorithmic systems for decision making that 
are objective and neutral, apolitical and value free, following the more general turn 
to ‘dataism’55. Algorithmically driven optimisation processes rely on a range of 
decisions including accessing a pre-existing data set, choosing between different 
abstract models, and the creation of model selection criteria. In other words, these 
algorithmic processes are based on a range of choices and decisions made by 
humans, and the resulting socio-technical systems can introduce, emphasise or 
amplify digital and social inequalities.  
Managing a city involves a multi-level set of strategic and practical decisions, for 
example on the allocation of services and resources, on the routing of public 
transport, and the funding of art and cultural initiatives. In its most general sense, 
optimisation of decision making in a city involves gathering evidence to inform 
policy development and the selection of an approach from among a set of 
alternatives which maximises (or optimizes) for some predefined criterion defined 
usually in relation to the public interest and quality of life in the city. Similarly, in a 
data driven optimised decision-making process, choices must be made as to the 
design and selection of the decision criterion, and how the assessment criterion is 
applied to the considered alternatives56. It is also crucial to know who chooses, 
which alternatives are considered, and what criteria or values inform the choice. 
Each of these decisions feed into the determination of the final decision, and each 
of these decisions is open to subjectivity and bias. Furthermore, any decision 
process, be it framed as optimisation or not, necessarily involves the selection of 
one outcome and the rejection of alternatives.  
The promise of current smart city technologies is that big data and AI systems 
will enable the optimal running of the city in an efficient manner. Indeed, as shown 
in Figure 3 the process of optimisation (or selection to maximize a criterion) is also 
at the core of modern AI and machine learning. However, it is important to 
recognise that the appeal to ‘smart’ data driven predictive technologies does not 
remove the problem of bias within the decision-making process, nor the resulting 
marginalisation of those who are not optimised for. The machine learning task of 
learning from data involves an algorithmic process that selects a predictive model 
 
54 C. Coletta, R. Kitchin, “Algorhythmic governance: Regulating the ‘heartbeat’ of a city using the 
Internet of Things.” Big Data & Society 4 (2), 2017, 20539517177424182017; C. Coletta, L. Heaphy, 
and R. Kitchin, “From the accidental to articulated smart city: The creation and work of ‘Smart 
Dublin’.” European Urban and Regional Studies 26 (4), 2019, pp. 349-364. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776418785214. 
55 See J. Van Dijck, “Datafication, dataism and dataveillance…”. 
56 R. Kitchin, “Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts.” Big Data & Society 1 (1), 2014, 
2053951714528481. https://doi.org/doi:10.1177/2053951714528481; Id., The Data Revolution; O. 
H. Gandy, “Coming to Terms with the Panoptic Sort Oscar.” 
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from a set of alternative models based on which candidate model best fulfils the 
predefined criterion. There are many different machine learning algorithms, for 
example, backpropagation, stochastic gradient descent, and linear programming. 
However, as Kelleher sets out, all of these machine learning algorithms requires the 
following inputs (1) a dataset of examples, (2) a set of candidate models that will be 
considered for selection, (3) a model selection criterion, also known as an objective 
function or a fitness function; and, given these inputs all of these algorithms search 
through the set of candidate models to find the model that best fulfils the objective 
function with respect to the dataset57. In effect, all these algorithms are optimisation 
processes, which differ in the ways that they define the set of candidate models and 
how they organise the search through the candidate prediction models.  
Figure 3 illustrated how mathematical optimisation is a key step within the data 
capture, data analysis and data driven ‘optimised’ decision process at the heart of 
modern AI and smart city technology. Within this figure the analysis step frequently 
involves using machine learning to induce a predictive model from the data, and 
then using the predictions of the model to inform/drive ‘optimised’ decision 
making. Importantly, for this discussion, although the term ‘optimisation’ can at a 
surface level appear to be a positive outcome, any optimisation is a trade-off. 
Optimising for one outcome necessarily means marginalising other possibilities. It 
is impossible for an information system to optimize for all outcomes at the same 
time. This is a crucial factor to consider when such systems are introduced into our 
cities and deployed in relation to public services. Just as with the optimisation of a 
social system, the choice of one alternative decision-making process (in this case, 
prediction model) necessarily involves the marginalization/discarding of alternative 
decision models. Although it may not appear that the preferencing of one 
computational model over another should be of serious concern to us from a smart 
city perspective this is not the case. In the modern smart city context these 
computational models have impact in the world and their decisions affect real lives, 
and so the selection of a particular predictive model through a computational 
process of optimisation of an objective function viz-a-vie a dataset is directly related 
to the marginalisation of groups and individuals who would have received better 
outcomes if a different model had been selected for deployment.  
What is more, the computational process of optimisation is as open to subjective 
bias as any social system of optimisation. The same questions that are rightly asked 
in the social context with respect to who chooses what outcomes we should optimise 
for, what alterative solutions will be considered and what criterion should be used 
to guide the choice, are also directly relevant in the algorithmic optimisation of 
decision making that affect our lives. Indeed, further questions are also necessary, 
such as which data is used or not used and why. Emerging research has found that 
the application of AI systems by city administrations and third parties to public 
 
57 J. D. Kelleher, Deep Learning. 
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services such as housing, health and policing, can result in very real forms of 
discrimination and inequality for urban inhabitants, as Virginia Eubanks has 
documented in the United States58 and Dencik et al. in the UK59. Thus, data driven 
algorithmic systems can result in a range of social harms and biases. 
Some research is now attempting to produce technical solutions to address 
discrimination, bias and marginalisation in AI systems. Gürses et al. note that an 
objective function may not consider the distribution of a system’s errors toward 
minority groups, or the fact that the objective function may not consider how a 
system’s performance will vary when it is deployed into different contexts to the one 
the data was sampled from60. Emerging technical solutions include fairness by 
design frameworks, pareto optimal outcomes and explainability in AI. Others 
propose non-technical solutions to the potential harms of AI systems including 
trusted third parties, collaborative online platforms, various forms of technology 
impact assessments61 and a range of high-level ethical guidelines have emerged. All 
these solutions provide some legal cover but leave many things unexplained. They 
also fail to question the nature of optimisation at the heart of algorithmic design 
making, and the continued unfettered deployment of big data surveillance regimes 
in social and public contexts.  
FROM DIGITAL INCLUSION TO SOCIAL INCLUSION IN THE SMART 
CITY  
In the contemporary city data is being gathered, aggregated, analysed and used 
to predict citizen behaviour constantly. Given the pervasiveness of data sharing 
across information systems, it is almost impossible to be ‘off grid’ or digitally 
excluded, even if one is a non-user of some of these systems. It is instructive to 
revisit national information and knowledge society policies from the 1990s which 
focussed heavily on overcoming the digital divide through enabling digital access 
and internet skills as a progressive form of social and political inclusion in society. 
Studies of technology use quickly found that digital access and use were no 
 
58 V. Eubanks, Automating Inequality. How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police and Punish the Poor. 
New York: St Martin’s Press, 2018. 
59 L. Dencik, A. Hintz, Z. Carey, “Prediction, pre-emption and limits to dissent…”. 
60 S. Gürses, R. Overdorf, E. Balsa, “POTs: The revolution will not be optimized.” 11th Hot 
Topics in Privacy Enhancing Technologies (HotPETs), 2018. 
61 P. Nemitz, “Constitutional democracy and technology in the age of artificial intelligence.” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 
376 (2133), 2018 20180089; M. Veale, R. Binns, “Fairer machine learning in the real world: 
Mitigating discrimination without collecting sensitive data.” Big Data & Society 4 (2), 2017, 
2053951717743530. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951717743530.  
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guarantee of social inclusion or equality of outcomes62. Even when access to digital 
technologies becomes more widely available in many countries and operational 
internet skills grew, the capacity of people to search for, understand and deploy 
information remained a challenge. Much of this literature now distinguishes 
between levels of digital divides including a first level of access, a second level of 
internet skills and use, and a third level focused on outcomes of use63. Digital 
inequalities in internet use for example persist in societies that are heavily 
networked and have been shown to be related to a range of factors including 
socioeconomic status and education64. Non-use and usage barriers persist due to 
variations in network diffusion and local public and commercial strategies and 
priorities. At the same time, we may need to rethink the concept of the digital 
divide entirely in societies with extensive data gathering infrastructures.   
Most top down smart city initiatives and bottom up commercial social media use 
are examples of first level digital inclusion and of data capitalism, and we need to 
be careful not to conflate that with individual or social empowerment or with social 
inclusion. Digital inclusion is not synonymous with empowerment or social 
inclusion. Most analysis speaks little of the negative and positive implications of 
digital exclusion for non-users. We must also think about the implications of digital 
inclusion in the culture of surveillance given the partiality of the vision or intelligence 
provided by the datafication of social life and the intensification of the prediction 
imperative65. In most cities and countries there are islands of digital exclusion and 
inclusion and differential impacts and outcomes of digital access. Existing systems 
of city governance and oversight are no guarantee that equitable social outcomes 
and accountability will be achieved through digital inclusion.  
Our fieldtrip to San Cristobál on the Galápagos islands challenged two important 
presumptions that we had of the islands prior to arrival. First, our knowledge of the 
Galápagos islands is filtered through the writings and teachings of Charles Darwin 
on the local natural environment and the primacy of his view of the islands 
overshadows and excludes the voices of the inhabitants. It is a partial view at best of 
the islands. A co-curated exhibition of work by local artists about the islands 
challenged his voice in many ways. A march by local teenagers against a plan to land 
 
62 R. Mansell, “Inequality and digitally mediated communication: divides, contradictions and 
consequences.” Javnost-The Public 24 (2), 2017, pp. 146-161. 
63 A. Scheerder, A. van Deursen, J. van Dijk, “Determinants of Internet skills, uses and outcomes. 
A systematic review of the second- and third-level digital divide.” Telematics and Informatics 34 (8), 
2017, pp. 1607-1624. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2017.07.007. 
64 E. Hargittai, A. M. Piper, M. Ringel Morris, “From internet access to internet skills: digital 
inequality among older adults.” Universal Access in the Information Society 18 (4), 2019, pp. 881-
890. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10209-018-0617-5.  
65 J. Pierson, E. Mante-Meijer, E. Loos, New Media Technologies and User Empowerment. 
Edited by L. Fortunati, J. Gebhardt and J. Vincent, Participation in Broadband Society. Berlin: Peter 
Lang, 2011; J. Pierson, “Online privacy in social media…”. 
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American military planes on the islands provided another bottom up perspective. 
Second, despite their location on a remote island off Latin America and mainland 
Ecuador the islanders, did not feel digitally excluded from contemporary digital 
networks or cultures. According to island museum, they have long had local radio 
stations and local television stations. This highlights that they have some control 
over traditional media representations of themselves.   
 
 
Figure 4: Public encounters with the Arts exhibition, San Cristóbal, Galápagos Event 25-26 July, 2019  
 
In July 2019 we organised a public engagement workshop in the local cultural 
centre in Puerto Baquerizo Moreno, on San Cristóbal island in the Galápagos 
islands. Following some short presentations on the topic of the Anthropocene, data 
capitalism and digital inclusion and exclusion we broke attendees into small groups. 
We used a diagram that placed digital inclusion and exclusion and data capitalism 
and data sovereignty along two axes to help structure discussions (see figure 5).  
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Figure 5: A diagram to structure discussions  
 
We began the discussion by asking attendees from the islands about their 
perceptions and experience of digital inclusion and exclusion. Many felt digitally 
included because they had access and used North American social media and 
internet services. They populated the top left of our diagrams with multiple 
examples of internet services we are familiar with in Western Europe including 
Google, Facebook and WhatsApp (see figures 6 and 7). Their internet access and 
speed were often poor, and they relied heavily upon commercial locations such as 
cafes and tourist offices to access it, but they did not feel digitally excluded. We then 
asked participants to think about how the economics of these services worked and 
how commercial data capitalism operated. Many were unaware of the production 
logics underpinning free data services and the differences between data footprints 
and data shadows. Most were unaware of alternative services to Google and 
Facebook including open source and co-operative platforms. They had not thought 
about what kinds of alternative digital services might be developed on, and for, the 
inhabitants of the islands. The complexity of digital inclusion raised important 
questions on an individual and a collective level. Participants were encouraged to 
move their ‘post-its’ around the board as our discussions developed. We discussed 
how services might move from the top left of the quadrant to the top or bottom 
right – or how a balance might be achieved (see figures 8 and 9). 
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Figures 6 & 7 – Discussion 1 on Digital Inclusion and Exclusion on the islands. Top left square heavily 
populated with examples 
 
 
Figures 8 & 9 - Discussion 2 on Data Capitalism and Data Sovereignty and summary notes of group 
discussions. Some examples starting to populate the top right quadrant  
 
Our workshop discussions underline the complexities of digital access and 
participation in the contemporary digital economy. We need to question both the 
marketing of digital media companies and classical liberal approaches to freedom 
and agency which elevate and conflate digital user agency and use of services with 
user choice and freedom. In the marketing and classic approaches digital user 
agency is often conceptualised, or framed, as freedom from the powers of the state 
and freedom to say and do as one chooses. Such an approach to user agency is 
evident in early North American cyber-libertarianism and what has been called the 
California ideology66. It is also part of the market led and the market/state led 
imaginaries and policies informing the development of the digital economy and 
digital markets67.  
If, however, we seek to engage with alternative imaginaries, values and 
conceptualisations that go beyond first level or instrumentalised digital inclusion, we 
need to shift the focus away from a negative freedom from, and towards more 
 
66 See F. Turner, “Burning Man at Google: a cultural infrastructure for new media production.” 
New Media & Society 11 (1-2), 2009, pp. 73-94. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444808099575; Id., 
From counterculture to cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the rise of digital 
utopianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010; R. Barbrook, A. Cameron, “Californian 
ideology: A critique of West Coast cyber-libertarianism.” The Hypermedia Research Centre, 1995. 
67 R. Mansell, Imagining the Internet…. 
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positive freedoms to behave within social and cultural contexts according to wider 
social norms, rights, duties and responsibilities. While such freedoms are always 
conditioned by the context in which they exist, a focus on freedoms in context, or 
localities, takes us beyond rhetorical forms of agency and moves us more towards 
deeper forms of human autonomy and the social good. If we are concerned with 
the relationship between digital inclusion and social inclusion, and more pertinently 
their relationship to equality and outcomes, then we need to look beyond 
individualised approaches to digital inclusion and towards structures that facilitate 
collective empowerment.  
These types of empowering structures are not evident in current approaches to 
public engagement and citizen participation in smart city projects. Current citizen-
centric and citizen engagement smart city initiatives organised by both public and 
private groups are driven by the need for political legitimacy of projects, the 
pressure to justify public investment and a desire to demonstrate research impact. 
Cardullo and Kitchin provide a scaffold of citizen participation in smart city 
initiatives68. In their examination of smart city projects in Dublin, Ireland they 
found that citizens most often “occupy non-participatory, consumer or tokenistic 
positions and are framed within political discourses of stewardship, technocracy, 
paternalism and the market”. The most empowering examples they provide include 
civic hacking and living labs. However, while hackathons, and living labs generally 
result in deeper levels of participant engagement, such initiatives are relatively 
exclusive (especially where programming skills are involved) and not available to 
all69. Running public engagement hackathons at weekends and in the evenings 
presupposes people do not have caring or other responsibilities, and most of these 
types of events rely on people bringing their own computers. Studies of citizen 
led hacking and coding initiatives found that they were fraught with frictions and 
contradictions70. Meanwhile, commercial social media provides a widely 
inclusive, but shallow form of digital inclusion, again providing a consumer led 
perspective on agency. Explicit attempts to engage citizens in co-designing or 
rethinking smart city initiatives need to be evaluated for their both their 
inclusiveness and their outcomes. 
 
68 P. Cardullo, R. Kitchin, “Smart urbanism and smart citizenship: The neoliberal logic of ‘citizen-
focused’smart cities in Europe.” Environment and planning C: politics and space 37 (5), 2019, pp. 
813-830. 
69 M. A. Barry, A. Kerr, L. Grehan, “‘Having our say’: Strategies for public engagement in 
responsible AI research and policy development.” Presented at the International Association for 
Media and Communciations Research (IAMCR), Madrid, 7 Jul 2019; A. Kerr, J. D. Savage, V. 
Twomey-Lee, “Decoding and Recoding Game jams and Independent Game-Making Spaces for 
Inclusion.” In P. Ruffino (ed.), Independent Videogames: Cultures, Networks, Technics and Politics. 
London: Routledge, 2020. 
70 S. Y. Perng, R. Kitchin, D. MacDonncha, “Hackathons, entrepreneurship and the making of 
smart cities.” Geoforum 97, 2018, pp. 189-197. 
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These findings are not surprising. Feminist scholars have found that gender 
‘empowerment initiatives’ often fail to address gender inequality because they focus 
only on individual behaviour, and not on changing the structural conditions or 
cultures within which this behaviour occurs. For example, a critique of gender 
empowerment initiatives found that empowerment initiatives were often 
individualised, required those who were already marginalised or excluded to do the 
work, and often left the structures and cultures unchanged. Empowerment 
initiatives to date also presuppose individual freedom, resources and capabilities to 
act – a feature that seems to display a distinct Western liberal democratic bias, as 
Sharma cogently argues71. For digital inclusion initiatives to move beyond 
performance and rhetoric, they must engage with local and global structures of 
power and issues of resources. The move in smart city projects towards citizen 
centric design and engagement remains largely performative, and there are few 
examples to date that focus on inclusiveness and social outcomes. Most focus on a 
limited set of needs and are shaped by interests far removed from the majority of 
inhabitants. How can we bring a focus on social inclusion and equality of social 
outcomes into our discussions? 
FINDING COMMON GROUND TO GOVERN THE SMART CITY  
Our analysis so far reveals four important aspects of data driven decision making 
in the smart city and surveillance cultures more generally:  
(a) Human behaviour is highly predictable, and even if your data is missing 
in a system it can be inferred.   
(b) Current data driven infrastructures amplify the ability of authorities and 
companies to surveil and control citizens without our awareness and with 
little accountability 
(c) Data driven optimisation involves a range of subjective decisions and any 
optimisation will benefit some citizens and marginalise others.  
(d) Digital inclusion and access to informational systems are no guarantee of 
social inclusion or equal distribution of outcomes 
The dominant approach in most smart city projects facilitates a top-down 
centralised and algorithmic administration of a city in the interests of the economy 
and security. Smart technologies can improve citizens lives, but the dominant data 
extraction and prediction imperative means that the systems are asymmetrical with 
regard to information. Further, they require, or in some cases force, citizens to trade 
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services for data privacy and control. The data shadow component of our digital 
footprint is growing and the conditions under which it is developing are largely 
hidden from us. An alternative approach is needed.  
A desire to rethink and redesign the socio-technical and economic structures of 
contemporary surveillance systems is emerging. Some are foregrounding normative 
ideals and focus on a good society or the conditions for a good life. For example 
some academics have been developing an argument in support of ‘good’ work 
conceptualised as work that enables creative autonomy, human fulfilment and is 
remunerated adequately72. In public policy we see a range of ethical guidelines that 
foreground ‘human autonomy’ in relation to the development of a good AI society. 
The 2019 guidelines from the High-Level Expert Group on Ethics and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI HLEG) state that ‘AI systems should both act as enablers to a 
democratic, flourishing and equitable society by supporting the user’s agency and 
foster fundamental rights, and allow for human oversight’73. Explainability is a key 
principle of the AI HLEG guidelines, and they define it both in relation to how 
intelligible the system is, and how accountable it is74. Sociological and critical 
communication approaches tend to focus on human empowerment, capabilities 
and social justice75. This approach to empowerment refers “to the capacity of 
individuals, communities and/or groups to access and use their personal/collective 
power, authority and influence, and to employ that strength when engaging with 
other people, institutions or society”76. It remains to be seen if these aims and 
guidelines can move beyond discourse and performance to effectively change 
practices on the ground.  
If we want to foreground human flourishing, well-being and freedom, and seek 
to retain democratic principles and social justice, we need to reimagine how we 
approach smart city projects and what they are for. Mansell for example notes that 
two imaginaries inform the dominant approaches to digital governance: market-led 
 
72 D. Hesmondhalgh, S. Baker, Creative Labour. Media work in three cultural industries. Culture, 
Economy and the Social. Oxon: Routledge, 2011; M. Banks, The Politics of Cultural Work. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
73 AI HLEG, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. High-Level Expert Group on Artificial 
Intelligence and the European Commission (Brussels), 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence. 
74 L. Floridi, J. Cowls, M. Beltrametti, R. Chatila, P. Chazerand, V. Dignum, C. Luetge, R. 
Madelin, U. Pagallo, F. Rossi, B. Schafer, P. Valcke, E. Vayena. “AI4People—An Ethical Framework 
for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations.” Minds and 
Machines 28 (4), 2018, pp. 689-707. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5.2018. 
75 N. Couldry, A. Powell, “Big Data from the bottom up.” Big Data & Society 1 (2), 2014, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714539277; R. Mansell, “Power, hierarchy and the internet: why the 
internet empowers and disempowers.” Global Studies Journal 9 (2), 2016, pp. 19-25; Id., “Inequality 
and digitally mediated communication…”; N. Couldry, “Capabilities for what? Developing Sen’s 
moral theory for communications research.” Journal of Information Policy 9, 2019, pp. 43-55. 
76 J. Pierson, “Online privacy in social media …”, p. 102. 
58  JOHN D. KELLEHER & APHRA KERR 
 
and state/market led77. She suggests that a third more collaborative commons-based 
imaginary is possible and could provide a more empowering form of governance 
and draw upon more horizontal forms of communication. We suggest that we can 
reimagine the smart city as a communicative space where the citizens are positioned 
as peers with the city administration. A city in which the asymmetry of the 
panopticon is replaced by a more symmetrical form of information flow, 
communication and governance wherein the citizen is able to see, understand, 
control and track the data the city has captured on them, and is also able to 
contribute to the selection, or deselection, of optimisation processes. Such a citizen-
city relationship puts two-way communication and the concept of locality – 
understood as a basis for communication – at the core of smart city design.   
In positioning a two-way peer-to-peer communication at the core of smart city 
design it is instructive to learn from research on human face-to-face dialogue, in 
particular the concepts of common ground, or mutual knowledge, and the process 
of grounding78. In human dialogue grounding is a process whereby groups of 
individuals work together to develop a shared understanding, and this 
understanding is grounded by the mutual belief between participants that all 
participants have a ‘clear enough’ understanding for the group dialogue to move 
forward. An utterance that has not been acknowledged as understood by the other 
participants does not constitute a contribution to the common ground, and as such 
cannot be used to progress the dialogue. The efficiency of the grounding processing 
within a human-human dialogue is partly due to the variety of acknowledgment 
mechanisms that can be used (for example, head nodding, or eye gaze); and, also 
to the principle of least collaborative effort which means that a speaker attempts to 
make their utterances as brief and informative as they can so that their partners can 
minimise the effort it takes to process and acknowledge them. Furthermore, 
research on grounding in human-robot communication has found that the 
grounding process can be strengthened if the robot reveals what it has internalised 
to its human participant79. 
Integrating the grounding process, the principle of least-collaborative effort, and 
the lessons from human-robot dialogue within the communication dynamic of a 
smart city/citizen would imply that: 
- a city should not capture, use or repurpose data relating to an individual 
without the citizen having the capacity and means to acknowledge that 
they agree to this, 
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- the process of requesting an acknowledgment from a citizen should be as 
informative and brief as possible (but ongoing and meaningful) 
- the smart city should be intelligible and transparent to citizens with 
respect to the data that it has gathered, used (and inferred) about them.  
With respect to transparency the concept of intelligible transparency is 
important80. For a smart city to be transparent, it is not enough to simply make data 
available. To be truly transparent a city should work to make this data intelligible. 
This involves being proactive in helping citizens to understand how, when and why 
the data was collected, and also to what purposes it could be used for, including the 
potential harmful outcomes that the data could contribute to, such as predictive 
privacy harm81, and data determinism82. The benefits of this type of intelligible 
transparent collaborative communication between a city and its citizenry regarding 
the data it collects and how it uses it has the potential to not only improve the 
trustworthiness of the city but also, as Greenfields notes83, to unlock the creative 
abilities of the citizens to develop new solutions to problems faced by themselves 
and their fellow citizens. Viewed in this way, the smart city can be understood as a 
platform for the development of new forms of contributory economy. It can also 
be understood as a basis for providing clear lines of accountability regardless of 
whether state, private or other actors are involved. Both transparency and 
accountability are core to explainability, as defined by the AI HLEG in 2019.  
A reimagining of the citizen-city interaction as a dialogue between equals may 
provide a useful starting point for addressing some of the serious ethical, social, 
political and environmental problems with current smart city designs and 
implementations. Building on this we argue that understanding the data shared 
between the citizen and the city as the common ground for a dialogue directs our 
attention to the range of constraints placed on mutual understanding by current 
structures and the lack of voice afforded to citizens and inhabitants. Without 
common ground, and mutual understanding, the citizen is repositioned as the 
object of surveillance and an inhabitant in a panopticon, as distinct from a 
participant in a dialogue. For a citizen to be able to engage with the city in a dialogue 
about their lives, they must know and control their digital footprint (or common 
ground) that is the basis for their communication with the city and the city’s 
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communication with them. Or a trusted third party could do this on behalf of the 
citizens. To empower and represent a citizen in this way requires the smart city 
infrastructure (and a range of other data services) to be transparent in terms of how 
they collect data, and what they do with it. Citizens must be provided opportunities 
to ground (or not) the dialogue and update the data that has been collected of them, 
and also to understand and control the uses to which this data is put. Finally, 
consideration needs to be given to the capabilities of citizens to participate and 
understand the dialogue, and the outcomes for them if they cannot. In these 
circumstances a robust governance structure that rebalances data extraction and 
prediction in the citizen interest and constructs clear lines of accountability is 
needed.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The Anthropocene is caused by the interrelationship between the rapid 
acceleration of thermodynamic entropy, the quest for total certainty in AI driven 
data management systems (or zero entropy in information terms), and an ecological 
crisis. The current pandemic is only increasing our consumption of energy amid 
demand for mediated forms of work, leisure and communication. In addition, we 
are now seeing a rush by state and corporate entities to develop Covid-19 contact 
tracing apps. This rush is occurring without adequate structures to protect autonomy 
or provide transparency and accountability. Under such conditions there is little 
time to build common ground, assess the technical limitations or social risks, or 
consider the uneven distributional impact of these changes. Zuboff noted that the 
state of exception following September 2011 enabled state and corporate interests 
to introduce many of the surveillance technologies which underpin today’s 
surveillance capitalism84. The current state of exception could easily normalise new 
levels of surveillance and fundamentally change our relationship with our data that 
will persist long after the crisis has passed. Indeed claims that AI can solve social 
problems if only enough data is collected are doomed to fail and may in fact embed 
a form of ‘functional stupidity’ within smart city solutions85. 
The paper has highlighted that optimisation and the prediction imperative are at 
the core of the technologies that underpin commercial smart city projects and the 
more generalised culture of surveillance. Despite its positive connotations, 
optimisation is not in and of itself a positive for city inhabitants. Any optimisation 
will prioritize one set of values, outcomes or individuals, and marginalise others. All 
optimisation processes involve a range of human choices and most involve 
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assumptions based on past events and a tendency to gather more and more data. 
Consequently, before any optimisation is acted upon it is important that a clear 
understanding of who benefits and who is marginalised is developed. It is also 
crucial that we go beyond technological solutionism to the issue of discrimination 
and give meaningful attention to democratic oversight and accountability. Current 
approaches to transparency and accountability exist largely as abstract principles and 
current solutions focus only on explaining the technical process while ignoring the 
human decisions along the way. To date the efforts at public participation and 
empowerment in smart city projects have resulted in increased levels of data 
extraction and prediction rather than citizen empowerment, equally distributed 
social outcomes or consideration of the ecological burden.  
This paper is not arguing for a recasting of smart city engagement with citizens as 
one of individual responsibility and choice. If we are to build ‘common ground’ 
between citizens and civic infrastructures and start to approach the ideal of freedom 
to attain human flourishing and well-being, then digital inclusion and public 
engagement initiatives need to go beyond platitudes, freedom to choose between 
services and skill building for the few. The citizen-city relationship needs to be 
reframed as one of peer-to-peer communication where the citizen is empowered to 
understand their digital footprint, the city works to collaboratively ground and make 
intelligibly transparent the data it has collected and used, and both can monitor the 
differential impact of these activities on the economic, social and environmental life 
of the city. 
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